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V AT THE TRIAL PROCEEDING GRIFFIN WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY DIVIDED FAIRLY BETWEEN GRIFFIN AND CORLETT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY SUPERIOR COURT AND THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO DIVIDE THE PROPERTY DENIED GRIFFIN OF DUE PROCESS
At the trial proceeding GRIFFIN was entitled to have the community property divided fairly between GRIFFIN and CORLETT within the jurisdiction of the family law court because GRIFFIN was discharged on August 10, 2000 J. N. 1. At the trial GRIFFIN contended and put in evidence that GRIFFIN was entitled to 100% of the community property because CORLETT sold all the property before trial. Family Code 2602 states “AWARD…deliberately misappropriated by the party”. Therefore under Family Code 2602, GRIFFIN should be awarded 100% of the community property because CORLETT conspired with STRICKLING and others to sell the community property in the bankruptcy proceedings C. T. 290 order of court after GRIFFIN’S discharge from bankruptcy. The court order on appeal herein Page one line 24 of the order (C. T 300,301) states that ” the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to make any orders regarding the community property”. Therefore the May 19, 2003 order of the court is void on its face. Costa v Banta 98 Cal.App, 2d 181,182,219 P, 2d 478. Also the order is in error because pursuant to Family Code Sec 200, the court retained jurisdiction during the bankruptcy court proceedings. GRIFFIN was discharge on August 10, 2000 and therefore the court had jurisdiction to decide this issue pursuant to the reservation of jurisdiction. The courts determination that the court lacked jurisdiction is erroneous as a matter of law. As in Costa v Banta 98 Cal.App, 2d 181,182,219 P, 2d 478, GRIFFIN has the right to have GRIFFIN’S community property divided by the superior court which is the court of proper jurisdiction. This right cannot be waived and was not waived. Therefore the part of the order stating that the court lacks jurisdiction is unconstitutional and a violation of GRIFFIN’S right to due process. Therefore the order by the superior court should be set aside.
VI PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA GRIFFIN IS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY ISSUES DETERMINED IN SUPERIOR COURT
The State of California and the Family Code afford GRIFFIN the Exclusive Jurisdictional right to have divorce, community property and family matters heard in Superior Court. The Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction to interfere with the GRIFFIN divorce proceedings as GRIFFIN was discharged on August 10, 2000. Pursuant to: B. R 67 Johnson v Fisher (1986)9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Also In re MacDonald, 755 F2d 715, 719 states “it is appropriate for the bankruptcy courts to avoid incursions into family law matters out of consideration of court economy, judicial and deference to our state court brethren and their establish expertise in such matters”. However, the Judgment (the subject of this appeal) completely avoids the community property rights by proclaiming that the jurisdiction is conferred to the Bankruptcy Court. There was no judicial notice taken of any evidence and no authority that supports that contention; in fact all authority supports the Superior Court as the Court of First and Original Jurisdiction because the divorce petition was filed first in 1993 and the bankruptcy petition was filed second in 1998. GRIFFIN was discharged on August 10, 2000 (J.N.1). The Federal Bankruptcy Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction after GRIFFIN’S discharge to hear family court matters as the federal court is prohibited from hearing the issue. The judgment is in error and violates GRIFFIN’S right of due process. As in Marriage of Brigden (1978) 80 CA3d 380 “this court has the authority to reverse the Judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court”. GRIFFIN requests that the case be remanded to the Superior Court to hear and make a determination on the community property rights and all orders of the Bankruptcy Court must be stricken.
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